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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In September 1575, Philip II stopped all due payments on his contracts with Genoese 
bankers, the asientos. That action triggered a financial and commercial crisis that turned 
out to be the most severe of his reign: for more than two years, it induced a near 
paralysis of the private credit markets in Castile and the stop of the main commercial 
fairs in Medina del Campo. Contrary to the traditional view, Philip II did not take this 
action against the bankers but against the main cities of Castile that were represented in 
the Cortes. 
 
Why should a stop of payments to the Genoese be caused by a conflict with the Cortes? 
In the political and fiscal context of Castile under Philip II, the Cortes controlled the 
"ordinary revenues," which provided the stable basis for the funding of the long-term 
domestic public debt, the juros. We showed in previous studies that each of the three 
payments stops on asientos by Philip II (1557-60, 1575-7, 1596-7) occurred when the 
level of ordinary revenues had become insufficient for the funding of more juros3. In 
 
this paper, we focus on the main crisis of 1575-77 and we bring new evidence. 
 
 
Our political economy interpretation of the crisis differs from the previous studies on 
the financial crises of Philip II. None of them refers to the evidence that we present 
here4. They all focus on the interactions between the Crown and the bankers and neglect 
two central points which are related. First, the cities imposed a de facto ceiling on the 
juros through their tax contributions and the increase of these contributions was 
politically costly for the Crown. Second, a large part of the asientos was financed by the 
Genoese bankers through financial intermediation between savers in Castile and loans 
to the Crown. This financial intermediation provided Philip II with a leverage against 





3 Álvarez Nogal and Chamley (2013) and ( 2014, Figure 2). See previous works about asientos and 
payments stops in Álvarez Nogal (2000, 2003 and 2008). 
4 Lovett (1980). Lovett makes many perceptive remarks but he worked more in the Instituto Valencia de 
Don Juan than in the archives of Simancas. He concludes: "the bankruptcy of 1575 took place because the 
bankers refused to advance any more money, and the king, in desperation, resumed for his own use the 
revenues assigned to pay royal debt." For Conklin, the bankruptcies were set by the bankers when the 
uncollateralized asientos reached a level equal to the penalty that the bankers could impose on the Crown. 
Conklin (1998). For Drelichman and Voth, the 1575 crisis was triggered by a liquidity crisis. Drelichman 
and Voth (2010) and Drelichman and Voth (2011). For an evaluation of the last study, see Álvarez Nogal 
and Chamley (2015). 
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stop to the bankers trickled down the pyramid of credit to their Castilian depositors. The 
severe impact on credit and trade led the cities to capitulate, eventually. After resisting 
for more than two years, the cities accepted and voted in the Cortes a doubling of their 
tax contributions upon which Philip II immediately removed the stop of payments to the 
bankers, on terms that had been agreed upon nine months before. 
 
The crisis of 1575-77 throws light on the political situation of Castile. As in other parts 
of Europe at the time5, the regime was not autocratic in fiscal affairs and therefore it 
was not autocratic either in political matters that were internal to Castile6. The central 
government did not have an administration to collect revenues. That task was delegated 
to the cities, the tax farmers and the Casa de la Contratación in Seville that handled the 
revenues from the precious metals. 
 
 
The Cortes represented the 18 main cities of Castile and their surrounding regions. They 
pledged by contract of about six years a fixed contribution (encabezamiento) to the 
Crown. The collection of these revenues was left to the management of the cities. Juros 
were serviced by earmarked revenues, as in most countries before 1800, including 
England in the 18th century. The juros that were serviced by the contribution of a 
particular city had a first claim on that contribution. Hence, cities kept control of the 
revenues for the service of their juros (which could nevertheless be traded throughout 
the realm) and these juros were the safest of the government bonds, with the lowest 
interest rate. Other juros were written on the revenues from tax farms or from the silver 
tax but they were not of the same quality and commanded a higher rate because these 
revenues were under the control of the central government and were more erratic7. 
 
 
For the Crown, the delegation of the tax collection to the cities saved on administration 
costs and yielded a lower cost of the juros that were issued on cities. However, the fixed 
contribution by the cities generated a de facto ceiling on the service these juros, and 




5 Dincecco (2009). Grafe (2012), Chapter one. 
6 This central issue has been highlighted by Jago (1981, 1985), and by the illuminating book of Fortea- 
Pérez (1990). For anyone not familiar with the context, the short review of Fortea-Pérez in Jago (1991) is 
a must. These works imply that the fiscal policy of Philip II cannot be analyzed as that of a modern 
centralized state. 
7 Ulloa (1977). Álvarez Nogal and Chamley (2014). 
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rose with the economy and military expenditures, the contractual obligations of the 
cities had to be raised, eventually. At such times, a crisis took place. 
 
In the early seventies, the attempts of Philip II to increase other taxes, (e.g., on flour), 
failed because of the opposition of the cities. Since an increase of the encabezamiento 
was long overdue, the cities probably would have accepted a moderate increase. But 
Philip II had decided on a course that would provide him with much more fiscal 
independence: in 1574, he declared a tripling of the encabezamiento. Cities and 
merchants resisted against the tax farmers who had to be sent to collect revenues that 
did not reach their target level. In any case, the new setting could not support a public 
debt under the same terms as with an agreement in the Cortes. When Philip II realized 
that this policy could yield a permanent solution, he turned to his financial weapon and 
stopped the payments on asientos, which led to the credit crisis. Eventually, the cities 
could not bear the economic cost and they demanded that the Crown should come to an 
agreement with the bankers: they accepted a doubling of their contribution. 
 
In the next section, we explain that although Philip II may have pretended that he did 
not understand much in financial affairs, he actually had become well versed in the 
workings of the credit market when he was the regent of Castile in charge of sending 
funds to his father, Charles V. He was familiar with the role of the bankers in credit 
markets and with the financial function of the commercial fairs at Medina del Campo. 
He knew how to use the credit markets as a weapon for his political goals: he had used 
it when he quarreled with the Pope in 1556. 
 
In Section 3, we analyze the relation between the activities of the Genoese bankers, the 
credit markets and the commercial fairs of Castile. We emphasize that Castilian 
residents had a large stake in the asientos through the intermediation of Genoese 
bankers and the chains of credit. We then show that the commercial fairs of Medina del 
Campo coordinated both commercial and financial trade. They acted a contingent clock 
for many financial contracts (both private and public, including asientos). Letters of 





8 The rolling over of short-term bills would become the dominant form of the public debt in 17th century 
Netherlands, as shown by Gelderblom and Jonker (2011) and Gelderblom and Jonker (2011). 
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needed the credit market and the credit market needed the commercial fairs. We provide 
and use a new documentation on the schedule of the fairs. 
 
In Section 4, we analyze the policies of Philip II just before the Decreto of September 
1575 and the reasons for the suspension of payments. 
 
Section 5 shows how the Decreto initiated a process that led to the freeze of the credit 
market in Castile, the cancellation of the commercial fairs, and the reduction of 
economic activity. The most recent world-wide financial crisis has brought considerable 
information on linkages in the credit markets and on the interactions between these 
markets and the markets for goods. A similar revelation of information has been left by 
the 1575-7 crisis in the archives that provides abundant support for our political 
economy interpretation of the crisis. The petitions to the Crown reveal that Philip II, 
consistent with his policy, far from punishing the bankers as the cities demanded, 
provided them instead with a special protection against legal claims of their creditors 
while allowing them to pursue their debtors. from some of the consequences of the 
payment stop. In particular, as the crisis affected all credit, bankers could not collect 
some of their own loans to residents of Castile. We document that the Genoese bankers 
benefited from a preferential legal treatment by the  government against their own 
creditors and in their collection of private debts. 
 
Section 6 is devoted to the end of the crisis. Our new material comes from two archives: 
Archivo General of Simancas, and Archivo Valencia de don Juan in Madrid9. 
 
 
2. THE PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF PHILIP II WITH FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
Philip II was called the "Prudent King" as he thought out the issues and kept the cards 
close to his chest. It was an important part of his strategy not to reveal all his thinking 
and to pretend not to understand finance10. However, before he became king he had 
spent much time in understanding the credit markets and their contribution to the 







9 We have translated a number of documents in the paper. 
10 Parker (2010), pp. 179-180. 
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his main tasks was the provision of funds for the war of his father, Charles V, to whom 
he wrote in 1553: 
 
“the main foundation on which the war can be sustained is money and credit and without those, 
one cannot do anything.”11 
 
The young Prince of Castile endeavored to understand the fiscal and financial system 
and during the 1550s, he kept his father informed about his activities in that task and 
about the problems that he encountered. 
 
On 6 November 1551, Prince Philip reinforced previous orders of Charles V on a 
interest cap12 by the prohibition of any interest charge for the letters of exchange within 
Castile, and by other policy measures13. The policy aimed at a lower interest for all 
loans but, unsurprisingly, it had the opposite impact: the credit market contracted and 
interest rates, including those on the Crown’s short-term debt, rose and in some cases 
tripled, from 9-10% to 31%. On 7 October 1552, Philip explained to his father that 
merchant-bankers in Castile had to take loans from foreign lenders with whom they had 
no previous association, at a higher interest, to the benefit of the foreigners14. 
 
 
Between 1552 and 1554, Philip II was seeking a solution to the issue. He consulted 
merchant-bankers like Rodrigo de Dueñas, whom he placed as finance councelor, and 
Juan Delgadillo who was agent of change in Burgos15. Shortly before leaving for 
England to marry Mary Tudor, he was presented with a long study on the markets for 
commercial credit by Bernardino de Mendoza and Francisco de Almaguer, two main 
officials in the office that controlled the royal finances. 
 
Philip II developed a network of officials (factores) with whom he had close relations, 
and who enabled him to bypass some bankers and get better credit terms. In 1556, he 
put in place Fernán López del Campo for Spain, Juan López Gallo for the Netherlands 
 
 
11 Carlos Morales (2003). 
12 In 1534, Charles V, prodded by the city delegates in the Cortes who had complained about the interest 
rates of the foreign bankers, had put an interest cap of 10% on the credit market in Castile. Ibid., pp. 282 
and 288. 
13 Aguilera-Barchet (1988). On 28 September 1552, a decree prohibited letter of exchange between Lyon 
and Castile, in order to favor the letter between Castile and Besançon, which was in the territories of the 
Crown. 
14 Carlos Morales (2003), pp. 288-289. Appendix, Document 1. 
15 Ibid., pp. 291-292. 
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and Silvestre Cattaneo for Italy16. López del Campo, in a report to the king, blamed the 
pragmatica of 1551 for the reduction in the number of traders at the fair of Medina del 
Campo from about 200 to 20, and in the volume of trade from 4 or 5 million ducats to 
half a million17. He recommended to reestablish the exchanges between Seville and the 
fairs in Castile and to allow credit between fairs, albeit with a maximum rate of 12 
percent. Following his advice, the regent of Castile (as Philip II was in Flanders at the 
time) promulgated another pragmatica on 5 March 1557, that restored the freedom of 
the letters of exchange and relaxed some of the 1551 restrictions. 
 
From his experience with the credit market, Philip II knew how to wield financial 
weapons to achieve his political objectives. In 1556, at the beginning of his reign when 
asserting his power was critical, he entered into a dispute with the Pope that turned into 
a test exercise for the later Decreto. Philip II held Paul IV in the pincers of the military 
and the financial arms. The army of Duke of Alba had come from Naples to besiege 
Rome. The Pope had asked, vainly, for help from Henry II, king of France. To take the 
city was risky when the sack of 1527 by the troops of his father had not been forgotten. 
Philip II forbade letters of exchange between Castile and Rome and ordered that all the 
citizens of Castile, many of them busy in financial affairs, should immediately leave the 
city18. The policy disturbed the transfers of ecclesiastical revenues from Castile, an 
 
important source of revenues, and the credit market of the papal territories. The Pope, 
unable to sustain high military expenditures, signed a peace treaty with Philip II on 
September 12, 155719. 
 
 
3. CREDIT MARKETS AND FINANCIAL POLICY: ASIENTOS AND FAIRS 
 
Asientos were loan and transfer contracts signed between the Crown and a banker, or a 
relatively small group of bankers. Under Philip II, most of the bankers came from 
Genoa. They were well placed at the beginning of the “Spanish Road” to the 




16 Hernández Esteve (2010), pp. 32-33. 
17 Ibid., p. 72. 
18 Carlos Morales (2003). Archivo General de Simancas [hereafter AGS], Εstado, leg. 121. Letter from 
the regent doña Juana to Philip II, 15/01/1557. 
19 Hernández Esteve (2010), pp. 50-51. 
20 Parker (1972). 
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essential role as the period’s “moneyed men”, that is, the group that Dickson (1967) 
would describe as indispensable for the functioning of the capital market in England, 
150 years later. Genoese bankers were involved in many aspects of the credit markets in 
Castile. Some of them were very close to Philip II and participated in meetings of the 
Council of Finance21. Then as now, the main task of bankers was not to supply their 
own funds but to connect borrowers and suppliers of funds. A central step in our 
argument is that the asientos were, for a large part, financed by the financial 
intermediation of Genoese bankers inside of Castile. 
 
In a credit contract, the lender provided funds (“dar a cambio”) to the borrower who 
took the liability for future repayment (“tomar a cambio”). A standard form of credit 
was the letter of credit that transferred money from one place to another, at a different 
time. The promise to deliver cash at another place could be rolled over back to the 
initial place. Short-term credit ("traer a cambio") could be achieved by means of letters 
of exchange between different fairs or different places. The price differences performed 
like an interest that avoided usury laws. Hence, the circulation of credit that was the 
counterpart of trade in goods provided a natural setting for purely financial transactions. 
 
 
3.1 Asientos and credit markets 
 
We have examined all the asiento contracts for the years 1570-75,22 which include most 
if not all the asientos that were affected by the suspension of payments of 1575. In these 
contracts, one encounters three types of clauses that attest to the interactions between 
asientos and credit markets. First, all the asientos in that period include a license that 
authorizes the banker to collect interests in the credit markets as required for the 
business of the asiento and for this business. The license exempts the banker and his 
counterparts from the laws of Castile that could constrain interest charges. 
 
Second, many contracts mention explicitly that the funds for the loan are to be raised in 
the credit market, with the expression "a cambio" that used at the time. In 1570, 88% of 





21 Carlos Morales (2003), pp. 291-292. 
22 AGS, Contadurías Generales [hereafter CCGG], leg. 85 y 86. 
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contracts, called factorias, all the funds were raised in the credit market. The interest 
rate on the asiento was left open to be determined according to the market conditions. 
 
For example, the asiento that Lorenzo Spinola signed on February 1, 1572 for the 
delivery of 120,000 ducats in Madrid (toward the construction of the monastery of San 
Lorenzo del Escorial) stated the sources of revenues for the repayment of the principal 
but it did not and could not provide specific dates as these payments came from the 
fleet. The Crown provided some funds in advance and for the rest, Lorenzo Spinola had 
to present his bill for the cost of borrowing in the credit market"23. The contract 
included the license for the free usage of letters of exchange at the market rate and it 
recognized that the interest payments on the loan would be adjusted to those of the 
market during the time of the loan operations24. 
 
The third type of clause is a license for the banker to "anticipate", that is to discount in 
the credit market, the payment orders for his reimbursement, called libranzas. For the 
year 1570, 48% of the volume of asientos allowed the banker to sell at a discount the 
libranzas. By selling early the libranzas, the banker could transfer the debt and the risk 
of the asiento to the buyer of the discounted libranza25. 
 
On 22 December 1574, eight months before the Decreto, Pablo de Grimaldo signed an 
asiento to deliver in Madrid the very large amount of 829,925 ducats26 in cash in three 
installments (1574, 1575 and 1576)27. The contract granted him the fixed rate of 16 
percent as compensation for the cost of interest in the credit market. The total of these 
payments was capped ("a buena cuenta") at 1,615,741 ducats which corresponds to the 




23 AGS, CCGG, leg. 85. Asiento with Lorenzo Spínola, 1 February 1572. 
24 A standard example is: "during the time of the loan until its repayment, the license to take and give 
freely exchanges at the prices that they would agree upon from one fair to another”. AGS, CCGG, leg. 85, 
asiento with Lorenzo Spínola, 1/02/1572. Another example is the following: “and for the cost they suffer 
in financing these through the carrying of the exchange ("traer a cambio") on their own account (...), 
interests with those that run in the market from now and for the length of time that we receive this 
service". AGS, CCGG, leg. 85-1. Asiento with Benito Salvago and Camilo Çibo, 30/01/1570. 
25 Ruiz Martín (1987), p. 292. Hernández Esteve (2010), p. 71. 
26 The amount is much larger than other asientos in 1575: the total amount of asientos in 1575, a year of 
high activity, was 5.4 million ducats. 
27 AGS, CCGG, leg. 86. Asiento with Pablo de Grimaldo, 22/12/1574. Appendix, Document 2. Since 
letters of exchange between ferias implied a high cost, relative to other forms of credit, the Crown was 
entitled to make early payments. 
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intended, at the time of the signing, to use the maximum maturity of seven years of the 
contract. The asiento specified that the banker could cash early ("anticipar y pagar 
adelantadamente") the libranzas that he received, by discounting them in the credit 
markets. 
 
The three clauses that have been described provide ex ante evidence about the tight 
relations between asientos and credit markets. We will see more evidence, ex post, 
when creditors to the bankers complained after the suspension of payment. 
 
 
3.2 Commercial fairs as a clock for financial contracts 
 
Today, financial markets operate continuously and the overnight credit market is huge. 
At the time of Philip II, markets were thin and slow. The rolling over of loans through 
letters of credit was paced by commercial fairs that were widely spaced in time. The 
main fairs (ferias) of 16th Castile took place in Medina del Campo, at the intersection of 
a north-west axis and of the road between Toledo and Burgos28. The position was 
 
central between the main cities of the Northern Meseta of Castile that had benefited 
from wool exports and most of them part of the Cortes (Valladolid, Zamora, Avila, 
Salamanca, Segovia). Merchants came from the main cities of Castile, from Flanders, 
France and Italy to what had become one of the most important markets of Europe. As 
in other countries, the fairs of Medina del Campo had been created in the 15th century29. 
They received the continuous support of the kings and were granted the title of "General 
Fairs of the Realm" in 1491. Twice a year, around in May and October, they also acted 
as a hub for smaller nearby fairs that took place just before the main one30. 
 
The concentration of commercial transactions had its counterpart in financial 
transactions. Each fair had a banker who specialized as a clearinghouse for letters of 
exchange and payment orders that connected the fairs with the main cities of Castile. As 





28 Ruiz Martín (2000), p. 278. 
29 We  cannot  reference  here  the  vast  literature  on  commercial  fairs  in  Europe,  in  particular  the 
Champagne fairs that linked the economies of the north and the south or Europe in a yearly cycle of six 
fairs from the 12th century on. 
30 Ruiz Martín (1987), p. 291. 
31 A theologian and economist in Castile, author of Instrucción de mercaderes (1544). 
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of the king from place to place with their table, boxes and books"32. The banker of a fair 
was committed by written mandate to follow the request of his contacts33. This function 
was recognized explicitly in the writing of some asientos: in June of 1575, the asiento 
of 15,490 ducats that was signed with Esteban Lercaro in the fair of Medina, which was 
taking place at that time, acknowledges a commission of 0.5 percent to the banker of the 
fair34. The bankers of the fairs were also linked with several commercial banks in 
Madrid35 and with Genoese bankers, including many of the most important ones such as 
Nicolao de Grimaldo36. 
 
 
The fairs provided focal points for payment orders: credit contracts were often 
contingent on a particular fair. For example, an asiento in March 1570 states that 
 
"... Joan de Curiel promises and is committed to give and pay to the person of the people whom we 
have sent, and in cash the afore mentioned 100,000 ducats … in the payments of the feria of May 
of the previous year in 1569, that is currently taking place"37 
 
In the asiento that was signed in 1566 by Nicolao de Grimaldo and Lorenzo Spínola for 
the delivery of 100,000 ducats in gold in Italy, the clock of the fairs is acknowledged by 
its imperfection: 
 
"and what will be paid in ferias should be calculated according to the actual date of payment, 
because Nicolao de Grimaldo and Lorenzo Spinola did not want to accept specified dates in the 
contracts as long delays could have occurred in these fairs”38 
 
Table 1 presents data on all the asientos that were signed in the years 1570-75. The total 
amounts for each year, converted in ducats and the number of asientos are in Column 2. 
Column 3 reports the fraction of the amounts of disbursements to the Crown that were 




32 Colmeiro (1863 (Reimpresión 1988)), t. II, p. 303-304, 501. 
33 Ruiz Martín (1970), p. 37. 
34 The expression used in the contract was: “librados en banco con más cinco al millar por el contado, sin 
que en ello aya falta ni dilación alguna". AGS, CJH, leg. 151. Copy of asiento with Esteban Lercaro, San 
Lorenzo del Escorial, 14/06/1575. This sentence is repeated in many other asientos. 
35 For example, the association “Gonzalo de Salazar y Juan de Carmona”, and “Juan Luis Vitoria y 
Antonio Suárez Vitoria”. Ruiz Martín (1970), p. 40. 
36 Nicolao de Grimaldo came to the fair of Medina del Campo in 1575, and delegated his business to his 
grandson, Juan Bautista Doria, when he left for Madrid. AGS, CJH, leg. 154. Memorandum, 1576. 
37 AGS, CCGG, leg. 85. Asiento, 2/03/1570. The document incidentally shows that the fair is "currently 
held" with a delay of 7 months. 
38 AGS, Consejo y Juntas de Hacienda [hereafter CJH], leg. 80. Copy of the asiento with Nicolao de 
Grimaldo y Lorenzo Spinola, no date (probably 1566). Appendix, Document 3. 
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betweeen the fairs of Medina del Campo, Madrid and the rest of Castile. In the last 
column, which is the rest, most disbursements were in Flanders. 
 
In addition to the business of the asientos, the fairs acted for the Crown as financial 
center for other fund raisings, for some sales of the juros, and for the trade of libranzas. 
Hence, orderly fairs were essential for the management of the public debt and its timely 
payments. Also, the running of the fairs depended on the timely payments of the loans 
to the Crown. 
 
Table 1: place of asiento disbursements to the Crown (see text) 
 
 
















1570 1992 (15) 85 79 0 6 15 
1571 3590 (19) 100 64 11 25 0 
1572 6131 (33) 79 45 17 17 21 
1573 2974 (16) 80 73 4 3 20 
1574 6137 (27) 54 27 20 6 46 
1575 5462 (24) 40 27 8 4 60 







Between 1567 and 1575, some of the bi-annual fairs of Medina del  Campo were 
delayed for various reasons. During the 1560s, difficulties arose from the revolt that 
started in 1567 in the Netherlands which was  the main destination for exports of 
11  
Castilian high quality wool39. Some merchants who were connected with the American 
trade defaulted in Sevilla in 1567, and in Burgos in 1568. Both cities were also closely 
related through trade with Antwerp. The reduction of business forced the definitive 
closing of the satellite fairs of Villalon and Medina de Rioseco in 1568. In 1569, the 
English captured some ships belonging to important Burgos traders whose insurance 
had to be paid in Medina del Campo40. Delays continued in the 1570s: the October fairs 
of 1570 and 1571 were postponed to 1573. 
 






Source: See Table A1, which presents the exact dates. Circles represent dates and 
numbers of fairs that were actually held (from 1 to the exceptional case of 6 when the 
King ordered all backlog to be settled in 1574). Squares represent fairs that were 
scheduled but did not take place around their scheduled time and were postponed to be 












39 Phillips and Phillips (1997). 
40 Lapeyre (2008 (reed. 1955)), p. 438. 
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In order to take advantage of the complementarities in market thickness, when a fair 
was delayed too long, it would be merged with another fair41. Because of the contingent 
credit payments, it was important that all fairs should take place eventually.  The 
Council of Finance (Consejo de Hacienda) received requests for the regulation per 
decree (cédula) of the holding of the fairs. These requests emphasized that due 
payments could not be made, including payments to the Crown, without the fairs42. 
Hence, the King and his councellors made efforts to minimize delays. For example in 
1573, Melchor de Herrera, general treasurer of the King, convened with Hipólito 
Affaitadi and Jácome Bardi, two important merchants-bankers of Medina del Campo, to 
stabilize the dates of the fairs43. Because of the accumulated delays in 1572-1574, the 
King issued a cédula in May of 1574 ordered the holding of all back fairs between 
October 15 and November 20 of that year44, and the cash payment of all debts without 
refinancing. The dates of the fairs are presented in Figure 1 and in Table A-1 of the 
Appendix. For the years before 1575, all the fairs that were scheduled eventually took 
place. 
 
The irregular inflow of silver from the Americas has been mentioned as a potential 
source of disturbance for the fairs45. The fleet would arrive usually in August, but it 
could be delayed or canceled. Figure 2 adds to Figure 1 the amount of the fleet’s 
precious metal. In that figure, we cannot see a relation between these arrivals and the 
schedule of the fair holdings. In the first half of the 1560s, fairs were held regularly with 
little silver. The most important feature of the figure is the clear break in 1575-77 during 
the suspension of payments when the flows of silver were not below trend. This break 











41 They would explain the end of complementary payments in the neighboring fairs of Villalón and 
Rioseco when all financial activities became concentrated in Medina del Campo. Ibid., p. 437. 
42 AGS, CJH, leg. 164. No date, probably 1574. Appendix, Document 4. 
43 "a causa de que se trata de reducir la ferias a sus tiempos concertados, si por caso se hiciesen dos de las 
susodichas ferias de octubre juntas...". Rojo Vega (2004), n. 5.882-6.714. 
44 AGS, CJH, leg. 164. Cédula, 31/05/1574. 
45 Mercado (1571), f. 14 vº. Lapeyre (2008 (reed. 1955)), p. 435. 
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Source: In addition to those of Figure 1, Lorenzo Sanz (1979, pp. 283-292 y 263-274). The vertical lines 
represent the amounts of silver that was brought by the fleet in each year. 
 
 
4. THE POLICY OF PHILIP II AND THE SUSPENSION OF PAYMENTS ON 
ASIENTOS 
 
The tax base for the service of the long-term debt, juros, was stationary in the early 
seventies46. The encabezamiento had not been changed since the resolution of the 
previous financial crisis in 1562, and the level of other ordinary revenues stopped 
growing in the early 1570s. Because of higher military activity in the Netherlands and in 
the Mediterranean sea, the domestic debt was growing and its service was nearing the 
level of ordinary revenues47. The point where no more juros could be issued was 
approaching. From 1573 on, Philip II made strenuous but unsuccessful efforts to 
increase the ordinary revenues. At first, he pushed for a new flour tax with a promise to 
gradually redeem all the juros through a budget surplus. Such a promise could not be 
enforceable and the cities rejected what would have led to a significant increase of the 
 
 
46 Álvarez Nogal and Chamley (2014). 
47 See our previous study, Ibid. For the negotiations in the years 1573-1575, see Fortea Pérez (1990), pp. 
42-88. Castilian spending in Flanders increased from 1.7 million escudos in 1572 and 1572 to 3.6 in 1574 
and 2.5 in 1575. Parker (1972), p. 348. 
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tax base. In 1574, with no progress in the negotiations, Philip II abandoned the debt 
redemption plan and declared a tripling of the encabezamiento that was at first accepted 
by the delegates in the Cortes, but then rejected by the cities. A moderate increase 
would have been sufficient to avoid a short-term crisis and the tripling of the 
encabezamiento was much more than was required to finance new juros for a while. 
That tripling may have scared the cities and stiffened their will to resist. But Philip II 
was playing hard and his authority was on the line. His actions are consistent with a 
long-time removal of the fiscal constraint by the Cortes48. 
 
 
The unilateral tripling of the encabezamiento invalidated the previous system of the 
decentralization of the debt service through the cities and started a showdown that 
would last for three years. Without the cities' collaboration, and without the competent 
administration for tax collection, the central government had to return to the pre-1536 
system of tax farming, a move that was resisted by the cities and their merchants. This 
outcome was not a policy goal of the royal administration either. During the 1574 
negotiation with the Cortes, a letter to Philip II from his secretary confirms that an 
agreement of an increase of the encabezamiento to 2 million would undoubtedly be 
preferable to a collection of 2.5 million through tax farming49. 
 
 
The events of 1575 confirmed the fears of the ministers of the King. For example, in 
Toledo during the summer of 1575, Torregrosa, the administrator who had been sent to 
implement the increase of the alcabalas reported that the city’s traders were willing to 
do everything possible to prevent anyone from taking the charge of a farm50 and 
threatened to stop trading in the city and to carry their merchandises to other places51. In 
Cadiz,  the  encabezamiento  had  been  of  7,500  ducats  until  1574.  When  the  King 
requested, by letter on 15 March 1575, a tax of 10% at checkpoints until the new 
distribution of encabezamiento would be determined, the city answered that it could not 
 
 
48 The scope of this paper is restricted to economics. However, a full account of the events will require a 
comprehensive integration of economics, political and historical events. See Footnote 6. 
49 "Garnica [the director of the Budget] has expressed a well founded concern about the difficulties that 
the administration will face in collecting such a large amount, (...), and there is no doubt that 2 millions 
sure and secure would be better than 2.5 millions in this way.” Letter from Mateo Vázquez to Philip II, 
15/02/1574. Carlos Morales (2008), p. 149, note 55. 
50 AGS, CJH, leg. 149. Carta de Pedro Luis de Torregrosa al rey, Toledo 3/07/1575. Appendix, Document 
5. 
51 AGS, CJH, leg. 149. Carta de Pedro Luis de Torregrosa al rey, Toledo, 4/08/1575. Appendix, 
Document 6. 
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afford it and that the tax would lead to mass emigration. Surprisingly, on 9 June 1575, 
the King cancelled the previous instructions52. At that time, the King might have opted 
for a change of course. 
 
In any case, overall revenues fell well short of the requested amount. Before 1574, the 
encabezamiento had been of 1,216,362 ducats and beginning in January 1575, Philip II 
had requested 3,716,363 ducats. Two years later and after much efforts, in the summer 
of 1577 and during the financial crisis, the actual annual revenues of the alcabalas were 
only 2 million ducats53. 
 
 
Bankers knew that an increase of the alcabalas without the cities' acceptance was 
equivalent to an extraordinary tax. It could not augment the tax base that funded the 
juros into which asientos could be converted. They nevertheless granted more than 5 
million ducats in new asientos54 during the first seven months of 1575 (the highest 
amount for such a time frame) against the recent increase of the tax. Their maturity had 
been restricted to one year55. But they could not satisfy Philip II. The only stable 
solution was an increase of the ordinary taxes that would be approved by the cities in 
the Cortes. 
 
Faced with a deadlock in the negotiations with the cities, Philip II made a radical change 
of policy. On September 1, 1575, he ordered, through a Decreto, the suspension of all 
payments on asientos56. This course of action had been strongly advised for some time 
by some high officials in his government. It had almost been taken in 1574, but at the 








52 AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas [hereafter CMC], leg. 1334. Distribution, 23/08/1580. 
53 Carlos Morales (2008), p. 199, note 196, with references: IVDJ, envío 22-B, fol. 108-120, 142-144, 85- 
87, 68-70, 208-213. Letter to Felipe II and Mateo Vazquez (summer of 1577). 
54Álvarez Nogal and Chamley (2014). 
55 Some bankers required additional guarantees. For example, Simon Lercaro signed an asiento in 
February 1575 that includes a lien on the first income that the king would receive as donation (donativo) 
or any other source. Given the relatively small amount of the asiento, 61,000 ducats, he may have had 
less bargaining power in recovering bad debts than a strong banker as Nicolao de Grimaldo. AGS, CJH, 
leg. 2001-647. Memorandum from Simón Lercaro, 1575. Appendix, Document 7. 
56 A few months before, he had asked his commander in Flanders to plan for a reduction in military 
activity. Carlos Morales (2008). 
57 Ibid., pp. 134-137. 
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The Decreto against the asentistas was cheered by the cities and the Cortes, in a parallel 
with the first reactions at the onset of the last financial crisis in the US and elsewhere, 
when many called for the punishment of bankers. As mentioned in the introduction, 
previous studies of the 1575-77 crisis have taken the similar view of a conflict betweeen 
the Crown and the bankers. The evidence shows that Philip II was playing a different 
game, which, to be successful, had to be hidden. Taking advantage of the popular 
approval, his first action after the Decreto was to summon again the Cortes, in order to 
resume the negotiations about the tax increases. 
 
The Crown stated after the Decreto that it would not default on the asientos but that it 
would require a revision of the payments with an interest rate of 1% per month on the 
balances due58. The Crown had actually a valid point. The state of the debts with the 
bankers was in great confusion because asientos could be collateralized by juros (juros 
de resguardo). These could be sold for cash by bankers and then replaced by other juros 
to be returned if the asiento was repaid in cash59. The bankers as "money men" were 
also active as financial agents of the Crown in the selling of the juros. Our preliminary 
research has shown that as a result of these multiple roles, the balances of the bankers 
with the Crown might have been very heterogeneous. Some bankers may even have 
been indebted to the Crown60. We will investigate this issue in further work. In any 
case, while debt contracts with bankruptcies are efficient in minimizing the cost of 
information from the borrower to the lender according to modern economic theory61, the 
information problem has been in reverse for Philip II. The Crown wanted to take 




5. THE PAYMENT STOP AND THE CREDIT MARKETS 
 
 
After the Crown freezed payments to the bankers, they could not pay their creditors, 




58 Ruiz Martín (1968), p. 141. 
59 Ibid., pp. 121-125. 
60 Forty years later, the Maluenda brothers had also sold more juros than they had disbursed to the Crown 
during an intermediary phase of the contract (Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley, 2015). 
61 Gale and Hellwig (1985), Townsend (1979). 
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the private credit markets, the payment stop threw wrenches through the wheels of the 
credit markets and the shocks propagated through the network of credit linkages, as they 
did in the most recent financial crisis. 
 
In normal times, when credit markets function smoothly, most credit linkages remain 
hidden. In a crisis, they emerge as rocks at low tide. The 2008 financial crisis has 
exposed the complexity and the critical impacts of these linkages. Likewise, the crisis 
that was triggered by the Decreto of 1575 generated numerous cases of distress which 




5.1 The impact on Castilian depositors 
 
 
During the payment stop, the bankers' creditors attempted to recover their deposits and 
sent numerous petitions to the Council of Finance. The following letter from merchants 
of Burgos is representative. 
 
“Andres de Larrea, Juan de Ybarra and Andrés de Ecija, residents of the city of Burgos, state that 
Nicolao de Grimaldo, prince of Salerno, Juan Fernández de Espinosa and Esteban Lomelin owe us 
more than 120,000 ducats cash that were signed in a contract in this fair for payment Sevilla, 
Burgos and in the libranzas of His Majesty following the ordinary service that we provided”62 
 
The petition highlights the multiple layers of the intermediation process in the credit to 
the Crown, which in this case took the form of discounted libranzas. Since the amount 
of 120,000 ducats was large, these merchants had borrowed on the credit market: 
 
“Our association, in order to discount the libranzas, had to borrow (tomar a cambio) from other 
people for payments in this Court, in Burgos and Sevilla and in Flanders, on our own credit"63 
 
The freeze of the loans by Castilian residents to the bankers had catastrophic 
consequences for trade, as attested by the numerous petitions that can be found in the 
archives of Simancas. For example, 
 
“The suspension of payment that was ordered by your Majesty has in fact suspended all the trades 
and has affected all the credit market and the spirit of the trade people, not only in this place but 





62AGS, CJH, leg. 155. Memorandum, 1575. Appendix, Document 8. 
63 Ibid. 
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A group of merchants in the region of Logroño (present-day northern Spain), 
emphasized that the payment stop affected not only the bankers of the King but also the 
small savers who had deposits with the bankers, and their commercial activities65: 
 
“We add to this the calamity and great poverty that from us is translated to many people who have 
entrusted us with their savings, under the thought that their were very safe and only from this 
service we provided they could support their houses and families. In this way, many craftsmen, 
ordinary people, employees and daily workers who lived and supported themselves by the business 
activities that depended on credit are now homeless and vagabonds”66 
 
The merchants explained that because of the suspension, none of them could pay their 
creditors and go on with their business. They requested the protection of the Crown 
emphasizing that without their contribution, the bankers could not have lent money to 
the King: 
 
“We have no other funds to satisfy our creditors except those that are owed to us by those who are 
affected by the decree. In effect, our funds were converted in the service of Your Majesty and 
without these funds, this financial support of Your Majesty could not have been provided”67 
 
 
5.2 The impact on the commercial fairs 
 
 
The freeze of the debt and its impact on trade prevented the holding of commercial fairs 
at Medina del Campo. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, no fair took place during the 
payment stop between September 1575 and the beginning of 1578. Contrary to what had 
been done before 1575, the Crown made no effort to keep a timely schedule. Such 
efforts would anyway have been futile. The Crown renewed its interventions only after 
the resolution of the crisis. On 25 April 1578, Philip II consulted with the cities on the 
means to resume the fairs and the payments that had been delayed since the last fair in 
157568. Contrary to practice before 1575, no catching up took place for the fairs that had 
 









64 AGS, CJH, leg. 155. Memorandum to the Council of Finance from various business people, 1575. 
Appendix, Document 9. 
65 AGS,  CJH,  leg.  155.  Memorandum  of  Diego  Ximénez  to  the  Council  of  Finance,  25/04/1576. 
Appendix, Document 10. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Espejo and Paz (1908), pp. 269-272. Colmeiro (1863 (Reimpresión 1988)), vol. II, pp. 836-838. 
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5.3 The impact on banks 
 
 
In Segovia, one of the main cities in the northern meseta, banks and economy activity 
were deeply affected by the credit crisis. In October of 1575, forty men all in important 
positions ("todos gente principal") were incarcerated. They had a participation in the 
capital of the bank of Gregorio de Haro, one of the main bankers of the city, who could 
not fullfill his obligations to the bank of Pedro de Angulo and Juan de Villar, who in 
turn, could not pay their debt of 8,000 ducats to the bank of Juan de Ibarra69. The large 
 
number of jailed individuals included Juan de Amarita, an agent of Simón Ruiz, the 
banker of Philip II, and also textile manufacturers thus threatening the entire economic 
activity of the city. During the crisis, the donations toward the construction of the 
cathedral markedly decreased70. 
 
In Seville, two banks that operated in that city went bankrupt in 1576, the one called 
“Herederos de Alonso y Pedro de Espinosa”71, and the bank of “Pedro de Morga y 
Matia de Fano”72. They had operated in the city since 1553 and had overcome important 
crises in 1557-1560 and 1567. These bank failures were a consequence of the Decreto 
not because of direct loans to the King but probably because of loans to individuals who 
had invested in loans to the King. The ties between Morga and the creditors of the 
Crown are illustrated by the statements of one of the debtors of the bank73. Andrés de 
Larrea, resident of Burgos, ended up in jail when he failed to pay his debt of 16,000 
ducats to the bank. For his defense, he argued that he would have liked to pay his debt, 
if not for his inability to recover a loan of 25,000 ducats that he had made in the last 
feria of Medina del Campo to Nicolao de Grimaldo and his brother. In the own words of 







69 Vela Santamaría (2014), p. 20. 
70 García Sanz (1987), p. 92. 
71 On Morga and Espinosa, see Ulloa (1977), p. 435. Lorenzo Sanz (1979), pp. 188 and 206. Ruiz Martín 
(1970). 
72 AGS, CJH, leg. 155. Memorandum from Esteban Lomelin, 1575. Document 11. 
73 Before 1575, the Crown had used the services of the bank of Morga, for example for the collection of 
the alcabalas in Seville after the city had rejected the new encabezamiento. AGS, CJH, leg. 154. 
Memorial de Agustín de Rivera, 1576. 
74 AGS, CJH, leg.154. Memorandum from Andrés de Larrea, 1576. Document 12. 
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The freeze of the credit markets spurred individuals, associations and institutions to 
develop stop-gap measures. The Consulado of Sevilla, a merchant guild who 
represented all the city's merchants who were involved in trade with the colonies, 
extended the time for payments of the debts until the Genoese bankers were able to 
satisfy  their  debtors75.  Bilateral  credit  agreements  with  mortgages  as  collaterals, 
censos76, were used by individuals and also by numerous municipalities for the purchase 
 
of bread, seeds, payments of short-term loans77. 
 
 
The Church was not spared because of the difficulties in transferring funds to Rome. It 
had used the agents of Italian banks in Castile and Aragon, (especially in the financial 
centers of Medina del Campo and Barcelona). At the end of 1577, Canobio, collector 
for Rome in Spain, complained to the cardinal de Como, a high official in Rome, that he 
could not send letters of exchange because of "ruina et poco credito dei genovesi" and 




5.4 The legal protection of the bankers by the Crown 
 
 
In face of the petitions and the complaints by residents of the Realm, the Crown 
provided legal protection to the bankers instead. Until the settlement in the Medio 
General at the end of 1577, this protection against creditors prevented any ordinary 
court of justice to force them to pay or seize their property. This decision extended to all 
types of debt since no distinction could be made for the debts related to the Crown's 
credit. Furthermore, the bankers used the Decreto as a quasi-official excuse to avoid any 
obligation in the set of complex credit linkages. 
 
For example, four royal decrees were sent to Juan Ortega de la Torre in Burgos to 
protect him from any suit for any type of debt. These measures expired in October 1576, 




75 AGS, CJH, leg. 151. Letter from the Consulado, 26/03/1576. 
76 Bennassar (1989), p.87. Yun Casalilla (1987), pp. 220-223, 237. 
77 The city of Valladolid had used such loans to pay craftsmen for the reconstruction of the city after the 
fire of 1561. 
78 Carretero Zamora (2013), pp. 99-100. 
79 AGS, CJH, leg. 154. Memorandum Juan Ortega, 1576: “the persons who are affected by the Decreto 
("decretadas") owe much more than my own debt of 100,000 ducats and I have no possibility to demand 
and force them to pay me back”. Ortega had to do some time in jail, however. Ruiz Martín (1968), p. 143. 
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credit problems and continued to operate in 1581 with branches in Madrid, Sevilla, 
Valladolid, Medina del Campo and Antwerp. 
 
Three merchants from Burgos had discounted payment orders by the Crown (libranzas) 
to three well-known bankers (Nicolao de Grimaldo, Juan Fernández de Espinosa and 
Esteban Lomelin). After the merchants' petition to seize the property of the bankers was 
rejected, they bitterly complained against the discrimination: 
 
"The delay [in payment] causes our complete ruin; the officials of Your Majesty are treating us in 
such a way that we cannot gain cause for our property and credit. Nicolao de Grimaldo and others 
are protected by Your Majesty, so that we cannot demand from law officials to seize their goods 
and incarcerate their persons ..."80 
 
Joan de Lago, an important merchant in Burgos, wrote in similar terms: 
 
 
"The payment delay leads to our complete demise. The officials of Y.M. (Your Majesty) issue 
orders such that we cannot prevail in our claim of payments and of credit... Nicolao de Grimaldo 
and our other debitors are protected by Y.M. such that we cannot request from the law that they 
seize their property and jail their persons, and they keep their book and papers as before (...) This 
causes us a considerable prejudice because they enjoy the use of the amounts they that have to 
pay"81 
 
Like Joan de Lago, Sebastian López de Orozco, an accountant, could not get back the 
1,792 ducats that he had loaned to Nicolao de Grimaldo a few months before the 
decree82. That was a small amount with respect to an asiento but Grimaldo refused to 
return the deposit in 1575, alleging that he could not because of the Decreto. Sebastián 
López, facing jail while the banker was unaffected, petitioned to the King 
 
 
“to enforce the payment and not permit the Genoese bankers to put him in jail and in a situation of 
great necessity, without any reason, because he did not do anything illegal. If the bankers force 
their debtors to pay debts, they have to do the same and to pay their debts to the people of 
Castile”83 
 
When Sebastián López learned that don Rodrigo de Mendoza owed Grimaldo a similar 
amount, he demanded the payment of that debt directly to him. Grimaldo instead 






80 AGS, CJH, leg. 155. Memorandum without date, 1575. Appendix, Document 8. 
81 AGS, CJH, leg. 155. Memorandum from Joan de Lago to the Council of Finance, 1575. Appendix, 
Document 13. 
82 AGS, CJH, leg.155. Memorandum from Sebastián López de Orozco, 1575. Appendix, Document 14. 
83 Ibid. 
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“the malice of the named Prince and [that] he does not pay not because he cannot but because he 
does not want to”84 
 
The creditor Andrés de Larrea petitioned the Council of Finance (Consejo de Hacienda) 
and asked for help to get out of jail. He could not use local law to recover loans in order 
to pay his debt: 
 
“and I find myself in the impossibility not only to pay the debts that are asked from me but also to 
pay a bail to free myself from this terrible jail to treat my sickness. I could not find any amount of 
money. For this reason I have suffered much oppression and trouble in the two months of my 
detention. During that time my debtors have been let free and are protected while I cannot recover 
my claim from them. Although I have made my requests, the town´s authorities do not want to 
issue an order of execution against them”85 
 
Because of the pyramids of credit, small people suffered too when they had entrusted 
their small savings to intermediaries who had forwarded them to Genoese bankers. 
Doña Francisca de Salazar, widow of Lope Rodríguez Gallo de Castro in Burgos, 
protested that she had loaned 606 ducats to the marquis of Auñón, General Treasurer of 
the King, through the bank of Antonio Vázquez. To recover her ducats she had received 
from Auñón a payment order to be presented to Nicolao de Grimaldo. But Grimaldo 
refused to pay. She turned then to the marquis who likewise refused. In her appeal to the 
Court in Madrid and the Council of Finance to obtain the payment and seize some 
goods of the marquis, she stated: “We have completely lost the credit, which is the 
nerves, the soul and the strength of commerce”86. 
 
 
This royal protection was not extended to other people in the realm who had to pay their 
own debts even if they could not recover their assets with bankers affected by the 
Decreto. The licenciado (holder of a degree) Mena was unable to recover his deposit of 
20,000 ducats from the Genoese bankers, but his own property was seized because he 
could not pay a debt of 800 ducats. He avoided jail only by a fire sale of part of his 





85 AGS, CJH, leg.154. Memorandum from Andrés de Larrea, 1576. Appendix, Document 12. 
86 AGS, CJH, leg. 154. Note of the secretary, 1576. The same source documents the appeal by Francisco 
de Rojas in Madrid to the Council of Finance to seize some property of Nicolao de Grimaldo who would 
not return a deposit. 
87 AGS, CJH, leg. 154. Memorandum from the licenciado Mena, 1576. "Demand from Your Majesty that 
since he cannot pay if he does not have cash (his deposit), Y.M. order to provide to him his protection as 
for the others and that the majors and the justice of this region enforce the payments of the debts by 
Nicolao de Grimaldo and Nicola y Visconte Cataneo." 
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bankers and not their Castilians creditors. These examples are but a sample of many 
similar documents in the archives of Simancas. 
 
 
6. THE RESUMPTION OF CREDIT AFTER THE AGREEMENT WITH THE 
CORTES 
 
In the recent crisis, after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the impact on credit was felt 
immediately and policy makers reacted swiftly. However, the response of economic 
activity and unemployment was delayed. In the 16th century, with the slow clock of the 
fairs and of the seasons, it took time for the cities to feel the full impact of the Decreto. 
 
When the initial cheers were replaced by a flow of complaints and petitions, and despite 
adverse events (e.g., the sack of Antwerp by his unpaid army), Philip II stayed the 
course. The  government of Genoa pleaded through its ambassador  in Madrid and 
reminded Philip II of the harm that was caused on merchants and bankers in this Italian 
Republic that played such a crucial role for the Crown88. In July 1576,  a special 
 
embassy impressed upon the Crown the undesirable effects of a harsh settlement upon 
the Republic´s internal stability89. The demands from the Genoese government were 
explicitly mentioned in the document of Medio General that resolved the crisis in 
157790. 
 
The crisis spread to markets in Genoa and Rome. Several governments tried through 
diplomacy to exert an influence on Philip II to find a solution. The King received 
proposals to create new financial devices to meet the state's needs and at the same time 
to circumvent the Genoese intermediaries.  The most important was the project of 
Oudegherste and Rotis in 1576 to create “Erarios”91. 
 
 
The Church intervened. The Papal Nuncio reminded the King that many non Genoese 
merchants were involved with the Genoese bankers – Spanish, Milanese, Florentine, 




88 AGS, CJH Libros, 42, f. 42v. Cédula, 25/05/1578. 
89 Lovett (1977), p. 100. 
90 AGS, CCGG, leg. 309. Medio General, 5/12/1577, fols. 3-4. Appendix, Document 15. 
91 Dubet (1998), pp. 205-212. This proposal was studied but not accepted at this time. It was presented 
again years later. Ruiz Martín (1969), pp. 607-644. 
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take with them partners, large and small. As usual, a plea was made for the poor widows 
and “honest” maids who had entrusted their dowries to the asentistas and were at great 
risk. 
 
Contador Salablanca, of the Council of Finance, reminded the King that if he wished to 
exert an effective presence outside the peninsula, the fairs had to be reinstated. Finally, 
even Nicolao de Grimaldo pleaded for some form of agreement, if only on an interim 
basis, so that he might placate his creditors92. Institutions inside the realm (e.g., the 
Consulate of Burgos who represented the interests of the main businesses of the city) 
also insisted with the King that he should come to an agreement with the bankers93. But 




Negotiations were conducted in parallel with the bankers and with the cities. For the 
bankers, the Crown created a commission that reviewed the sales of the collateral (juros 
de resguardo) by the bankers, and the position of each banker with the Crown. That 
commission examined all the asientos that had been signed since 14 November 1560, 
296 contracts with 66 people (Nicolao de Grimaldo 35, Lucian Centurion 34, Lorenzo 
Spinola 32, and so on)94. The balance of each active asiento was computed by bringing 
past payments to the current date with the standard monthly interest rate of one percent. 
 
In the early spring of 1577, the Crown and the bankers agreed on the amount of 15.2 
million ducats95. But settling with the bankers was not the main issue for Philip II, and 
he may have waited with the bankers until March 1577 because he was not rushed: 
progress in the Cortes was so slow96. The squeeze had to go on. During the spring and 
the summer of 1577 Philip II had prepared a reduction of the encabezamiento (from the 
 
 
92 Lovett (1977). 
93 AGS, CJH, leg. 151. Letter of Andrés de Cañas to Juan de Escobedo, (secretary of Philip II), 
20/04/1576. 
94 Carlos Morales (2008), p. 166. 
95 The larger part of the debt was not in unpaid arrears, but in repayments that were contractually 
scheduled for the future. From an examination of all the asientos that were initiated between 1570 and 
1575 (and some before 1570), it appears that the total amount of the payments scheduled after 1575 
exceeded 12 million ducats. Given the average maturity of these remaining liabilities, an approximate 
estimate of the present value of the scheduled repayments is about 10 million ducats. Arrears would then 
represent about 5 million ducats. 
96 The sack of Antwerp by the unpaid Spanish troops, on November 4, 1576, seems to be a non-event for 
the negotiations. 
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tripling in 1574) if the cities would grant the servicio ordinario and  the servicio 
extraordinario97. In the summer of 1577, he reiterated that the signing with bankers 
could not proceed as long as the cities did not agree to a tax increase. A letter written on 
behalf of the King by his secretary emphasizes the close relation between the two 
issues: 
 
“Since you have sent me these reports on the matter of the Medio General and of the 
encabezamiento, I have examined and reflected with great care on the first and on the second. Both 
matters are important in the substance (...) and I hold each matter much dependent on the other”98 
 
The following month, Juan Fernández de Espinosa, General Treasurer of Castile, sent 
instructions from the King to Mateo Vázquez, Secretary of Philip II, that demonstrate 
how the two issues, suspension of payments and increase of the encabezamiento, were 
linked: 
 
“Make sure that among the negotiators they have no power, occasion, or license to err in matters 
that are so important and so few, namely these two matters, the signing of the Medio (agreement 
with the bankers) and the encabezamiento”99 
 
Finally, the cities relented. On 29 October 1577, a new encabezamiento was voted in the 
Cortes. In previous adjustments, increases had been roughly proportional across cities. 
But in 1577, the shares of some cities jumped up, Seville from 10.2 to 17.5 percent, 
Toledo from 5.8 to 7.6 percent, while Granada's share dropped from 9.2 to 5 percent. 
After the agreement on the encabezamiento, the voting on the servicio extraordinario 
was sped up and a final agreement was reached on November 16, 1577. 
 
Once the stumbling block in the Cortes had been removed, the Medio General was 
signed with the bankers two weeks later, on 5 December 1577, under the terms of the 






97 Instituto Valencia de Don Juan [hereafter IVDJ], Envío 76, fols. 554-557. San Lorenzo del Escorial, 
7/07/1577. Minutes of a letter written in name of Philip II by his secretary. Appendix, Document 17. 
98 Ibidem. 
99 IVDJ, Envío 22. Caja 33, TB 49, folio 98. Letter from Fernández de Espinosa to Mateo Vázquez, 
11/08/1577. Appendix, Document 16. 
100 Some debt reduction took place in the text of the agreement. The evaluation of the actual debt 
reduction requires another study that would need to address at least two major issues. First, some of the 
redeemable juros were refinanced at a lower interest rate. Given the fragmented nature of the capital 
market for the juros that were tied to cities, the reduction of the rate on a juro was done by augmenting 
the capital, for an unchanged coupon, with the option for the holder to cash the face value. The second 
issue is that the bankers who suffered a statutory loss on their asientos in the Medio General, received 
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In the text of the Medio General, the King made it clear that in settling with the 
bankers, he was following the express wish of the cities: 
 
“…and adding to all this the demand that was addressed with particular insistence about the same 
affairs by the delegates of the realm who are gathered in the Cortes that we are holding at the 
present time in Madrid”101 
 
A decree that was issued six months after the settlement repeats: 
 
“Given the pressing demands on this same issue by the ambassadors that were sent to us by the 
republic of Genoa and by the delegates in the Cortes, we ordered to settle with these business 
people (personas de negocios) the Medio General on December 5 in the past year”102 
 
On April 25, 1578, Philip II consulted with the main cities and institutions on how to 
resume and solve the problems of the fairs103. The general response was that the 1575 
suspension had caused enormous harm to trade104. After an interruption of three years, 
the fairs resumed on 28 October 1578, as ordered by a royal decree on 5 August 
1578105. All the pending payments were made at that fair. However, the extended gap 
between 1575 and 1578 had a permanent impact and the fairs of Medina del Campo lost 
their role as central financial markets of Spain. Merchants and bankers had developed 
letters of exchange al uso that could be paid at places other than Medina del Campo106. 
During the crisis of 1575-1577, the financial activities in Medina had been gradually 
transferred to Madrid where many of the asientos had been negotiated before 1575 and 
where the government and the bankers resided. After the crisis, some of these activities 





The analysis of the credit crisis 1575-1577, which is based on new archival material, is 
revealing on the structure of the Castilian credit market and throws light on the actions 




some compensations in the years after 1577, including clawback provisions in new asientos. The archives 
contain information but it is dispersed and difficult to trace. 
101 AGS, CCGG, leg. 309. Medio General, 5/12/1577, fols. 3-4. Appendix, Document 15. 
102 AGS, CJH Libros, 42, f. 42v. Copia cédula, Madrid, 25/05/1578. Appendix, Document 18. 
103Espejo and Paz (1908), pp. 269-272. 
104 Lapeyre (2008 (reed. 1955)), pp. 447-48, Espejo and Paz (1908), pp. 94, 296 y 309. 
105 AGS, CCA, DIV, 48-6. 
106 Lapeyre (2008 (reed. 1955)). Already before 1575, some letters had been written on the feria of Alcalá 
de Henares, which was closer to the royal court or even at Madrid (which had no fair). Ruiz Martín 
(1987), pp. 281-282. 
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autonomy limited the state’s power and enabled them to bargain with the King. In some 
way, the involvement of the cities in the collection of revenues and the service of the 
domestic debt benefited the Crown because it enhanced the credibility of the debt and 
lowered its cost. But their fixed contributions, negotiated and voted in the Cortes, 
imposed a de facto ceiling on domestic public debt and on the ability of the King to 
refinance the short-term debt into long-term debt. The payment stop of 1575 was 
protracted because Philip II decided to remove that ceiling through a very large increase 
of the taxes and the cities resisted until the economic burden became too high. 
 
By issuing the Decreto, Philip II could channel some of the Realm's upset against the 
Genoese bankers, but he protected them in practical situations. The numerous petitions 
to the King, the protection of the Genoese bankers against Castilian creditors, the 
reports of Philip II on the credit market before he became king, letters during the crisis, 
all these show that the "Prudent king" was aware that a large part of asientos were 
financed by the bankers' intermediation of credit and savings in Castile, and that the 
payment stop would put an economic squeeze on the Cortes. In an early example of a 
struggle on the debt ceiling between an executive and a representative assembly, the 
temporary victory of Philip II was achieved at a high economic cost for the Realm. 
 
As the ceiling on the service of the juros was lifted, all the asientos were refinanced into 
juros. This point is important and has been neglected in the literature. The settlements of 
each of the three financial crises under Philip II included a complete refinancing of the 
asientos into juros. The debt to the bankers was not reduced to an intermediate level. It 
was reduced to zero. That feature is not surprising once it is clear that first, temporary 
adverse shocks to the budget should be absorbed through unfunded debt, asientos, 
second, an accumulation of asientos which corresponds to a permanent shock, should be 
converted to funded debt, juros, third, the crises took place when the conversion process 
could not take place because of the effective ceiling on the further emission of juros. 
The settlements enable the Crown to make these refinancings. 
 
The routine refinancing of the unfunded debt into funded long-term term debt in 16th 
century Castile is remarkable. France and England struggled to refinance their 
unfunded debt after 1700 and the wars of Louis XIV, and they took the indirect route of 
a refinancing through charter corporations. In France, that led to a failure after the 
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disaster of John Law. England took more than twenty years after the Glorious 
Revolution to significantly reduce its unfunded debt107. In a previous study108, we have 
analyzed an example of such a refinancing through an asiento in 1595, and we will 

























































107 See Figure 4.9 in Brewer (1988). The transition from unfunded to funded debt is discussed in Quinn 
(2008). 
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holding a fair 
Number of 
fairs held 
Name of the fairs that were held at that date 
2/1556 1 10/1555   
12/1556 1 5/1556   
2/1557 1 10/1556   
8/1557 1 5/1557   
12/1558 2 10/1557 5/1558  
4/1559 1 10/1558   
8/1560 1 5/1559   
12/1560 2 10/1559 5/1560  
8/1561 1 5/1561   
2/1562 1 10/1561   
8/1562 1 5/1562   
2/1563 1 10/1562   
10/1563 1 5/1563   
2/1564 1 10/1563   
10/1564 2 5/1564 10/1564  
2/1566 1 5/1565   
8/1566 1 10/1565   
4/1567 1 5/1566   
10/1567 1 10/1566   
10/1568 2 5/1567 5/1568  
6/1569 2 10/1567 10/1568  
12/1569 1 5/1569   
10/1570 1 10/1569   
12/1571 2 5/1570 5/1571  
4/1573 2 10/1570 10/1571  
10/1574 6 5, 10/1572 5, 10/1573 5, 10/1574 
6/1575 1 5/1575   
10/1578 1 10/1578   
8/1579 1 5/1579   
2/1580 1 10/1579   
8/1580 1 5/1580   
 
 
Sources: AGC, CMC 2ª época, leg. 983. Constantin Gentil. Accounts since 1561 
Lapeyre (2008, pp. 436, 442), AGS, CJH, leg. 80. Copy of the asiento with Nicolado de 
Grimaldo y Lorenzo Spinola, 1566. AGS, CJH, leg. 164. Cédula, 31 May 1574. Carlos 
Morales (2008, p. 112). Ulloa (1977, p. 776). Abed (1986, pp. 91-92). Hernández 
Esteve (2010, pp. 72, 116, 121). 
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Each fair can be traced by a number of documents. The merchants and the bankers 
wrote contracts contingent on fairs that were named by their dates. If a fair was delayed, 
it was merged with a later fair but it kept its name (its scheduled date). Hence, some 
asientos may have been signed at a date posterior to payment dates. For example, the 
fair of May 1570 was delayed but kept its name. On 4 January 1572, Agustín Gentil 
signed an asiento with the promise to deliver 160 000 ducats "in the May fairs of 1570 
and 1571that are being held together now". 
 
 
For May fair of Medina del Campo, the schedule for payments was between 15 July and 
10 August. For the October fair, the payments were scheduled for December. The 
sources are not very accurate on the exact day of the beginning and the end of the fairs. 
We have put a unique month for the date of the fair, but a fair could be held over more 
than a month. We have references on the fair of May in 1560 but no information on the 









Document 1.CDCV, m, pp. 509-510. Carta de Felipe II a Carlos V, 7/10/1552. 
 
 
“Los del Consejo de la Hazienda me han dicho algunas vezes que los cambios se han subido y 
suben de cada día a muy excessiuos precios, de que Vuestra Magestad y los naturales destos 
Reynos reciben gran daño, porque lo que costaua nueue o diez por ciento cuesta agora treinta y 
treinta y uno, y que esto ha resultado de la premática que se ha hecho para que no puedan dar ni 
tomar a cambio de feria a feria, ni de las ferias para Seuilla, porque con esto se han desacomodado 
mucho los mercaderes destos Reynos, speçialmente los naturales dellos, que por no caer en falta de 
sus créditos toman dineros a cambio de los estrangeros para fuera del Reyno, sin tener allá 
respondientes. Y como los estrangeros lo supplen todo, bueluen de allá con mucho daño, y assy 
vienen a ganar ellos y perder los naturales. Y aunque la premática deue ser justa y conforme a 
consciencia, en este tiempo ha sido muy dañosa para la Hazienda de Vuestra Magestad y de los 
mercaderes naturales, la qual se pudiera excusar pues por las leyes e derecho destos Reynos estaua 
ya proueydo lo que en ella se manda, y acá mirasse mucho en no dispensar con ella por hauer tan 
poco se hizo. Y los que allá contractan con Vuestra Magestad negocian que se derogue, y de saber 
que Vuestra Magestad manda que se dissimule con ellos piden lo mismo los de acá, y como no se 
les da passasse mucho trabajo en hallar dineros de otra manera. También ha resultado desta 
premática que como los mercaderes estrangeros nopueden tractar dentro del Reyno con los dineros 
procurar de sacarlos del, y allá como veen la suya quando se los piden para el seruycio de Vuestra 
Magestad, despachan licencias para sacarlos, por virtud de las quales han sacado y sacan grandes 
quantidades de dineros para Italia y allá véndenlos bien a Vuestra Magestad, y acá ponen 
estréchela en la moneda, ques causa de costar más a los que la han menester. Y assy se aprouechan 
ellos por todas vías y estos Reynos y los naturales dellos padescen mucho y andan trabajados y 
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descontentos de no tener la libertad que solían para sus tractos y commerçios, y specialmente 
Seuilla dizen que recibe mucho daño, y que por esto se disminuye el tracto de las Yndias»109 
 
Document 2. AGS, CCGG, 86. Asiento con Pablo de Grimaldo, 22/12/1574 
 
 
El dicho Pablo de Grimaldo 
Asiento 
Tomado con Simón Palavesín en su nombre  




Lo que por nuestro mandado se asienta y concierta con Simón Palavesín en nombre de Pablo de 
Grimaldo sobre 311.222.020 mrs que se nos han de probeher en nombre del dicho Pablo de 
Grimaldo para cosas de nuestro servicio como adelante ira declarado es lo siguiente: 
 
Primeramente el dicho Simón Palabessin en el dicho nombre promete y se obliga que se pagaran a 
quien por nos fuere mandado 
 
los dichos 311.222.020 en reales de contado en esta Corte es a saber 43.302.950 dellos en fin deste 
presente mes de diciembre, y 265.569.293 mrs en fin del mes de diciembre del año venidero de 
1575 y los 2.349.777 mrs restantes el dia de San Juan de Junio del año de 1576. 
 
Los quales dichos 311.222.020 damos facultad al dicho Pablo de Grimaldo para que los pueda 
traer y traiga a cambio sobre su crédito y por nuestra quenta desde los susodichos días que los ha 
de pagar hasta los plazos de las ynfraescritas consignaciones que se le dan de que ha de ser pagado 
contando sobre las consignaciones que se le dan en el subsidio y servicio un mes más del plazo 
dellas por el gasto y dilación de la cobranza 
 
Y nos contentamos y tenemos por bien porque tome a su cargo y riesgo el dicho Pablo de 
Grimaldo como lo toma lo que costaren los dichos intereses deste asiento se le libren y hagan 
buenos por ellos 16 por ciento a cabo de año intereses sobre intereses quierle questen mas quierle 
questen menos. 
 
En lo qual respecto de cómo a el presente corren y pasan los negocios e intereses nos tenemos por 
bien servido del 
 
Document 3. AGS, CJH, 80. Copy of the asiento with Nicolao de Grimaldo y Lorenzo 
Spinola, no date (1566 o 1567) 
 
“y lo que se le librare en ferias se le quente en los tiempos que los pagamentos de aquellas se 
hicieren, porque los dichos Nicolao de Grimaldo y Lorenzo Spínola, no an querido venir en que se 
les cargue esto de las ferias en días precisos a causa de las prorrogaciones y largas que podía haver 
en ellas”. 
 
Document 4. AGS, CJH, 164. Sin fecha, probablemente 1574. 
 
 
“que por cuanto su Majestad mandó por su real cédula que los cambios que estaban asistiendo en 
Medina del Campo a los pagos de feria de octubre de 1570 y 1571 viniesen a esta Corte a acabar 




109 Carlos Morales 2003 cambios, p. 288-289. 
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y acabados muchos días ha y los dichos cambios no pueden pagar los restos que deven sin que las 
personas que les deven en todo el reino les acudan a pagar las cantidades que les deben diciendo 
que los dichos pagos no son acabados de que se les recrecen muchos daños y intereses y a su 
Majestad de servicio, los dichos cambios nos han pedido que les diésemos ejecutores para que 
fuesen a cobrar de las personas que les deben qualquier maravedies (a costa de los deudores)” 
 
Document 5. AGS, CJH, 149. Carta de Pedro  Luis de Torregrosa al rey, Toledo, 
3/07/1575. 
 
“Ayer estuve en casa del corregidor con los regidores y trajeron consigo algunos hombres de 
negocios conferimos el negocio y todos conceden que estaban muy relevados en los tratos y de tal 
manera que confiesan los tratantes que hera tan poco lo que pagaban de alcabala en el 
encabezamiento pasado que no lo cargaban en las mercadurías porque no era de consideración. Yo 
les repliqué que quanto menos pagaban abra lugar de más acrecentamiento, lo qual no se podrá 
hacer así en lo que está muy subido, con todo eso están muy firmes en su opinión de que si se 
creciese el alcabala ni aún a tres por ciento en las cosas de comercio que cesaría y como ven que 
con los arrendamientos tienen aparejo para con los arrendadores de hacer dellos lo que quieren y 
que con abstenerse de tratar por algunos días y que cuando se acerque el fin del año han de hacer 
con ellos todo lo que quisieren y por todos los medios que pudieren procurar de destruirles para 
que otros no se atrevan a arrendar están en esto tan en su negocio, y creyendo que siempre ha de 
ser por aquel camino y que no se a de hacer por otro” 
 
Document  6.  AGS,  CJH,  149.  Carta  de  Pedro  Luis  de  Torregrosa  al  rey,  Toledo 
4/08/1575. 
 
“Asi mismo les dije que si juntado con los 65.000.000 mrs y con lo que digo en este capitulo que 
es de mucha consideración ay lo de la ratta de los meses de enero y febrero y 24 de marzo y que si 
V. md. me mandase cobrar a 10 por ciento como le pertenece que subiría de los 80.000.000 mrs en 
que V. md. se la ha mandado ofrecer y allende desto les dije todo lo que me pareció que convenia 
para dalles a entender quan bien les estaba encabezarse y dellos ni de todo lo que hasta oy he 
podido entender de los del regimiento y de todos los más inteligentes y de negocios no se saca otra 
cosa ni la dizen, sino que con cualquier cosa que se les lleve a los tratantes más de lo que antes 
solian pagar en el encabezamiento pasado ha de cesar todo el comercio y que si sacan de Toledo 
80.000.000 mrs cada año que es imposible que ya que los aya para este año que los pueda aver 
para el que viene. Yo les he replicado a esto y dado razones tan concluyentes que me parece que se 
pudieran y devieran satisfacer, no lo hacen. En mi debe de estar la falta, aunque no en la voluntad” 
 
(…) “los hombres de negocios de esta ciudad no están nada bien con los arrendadores antes 
procuran hacerles todo el daño que pueden y amenazándoles que no han de tratar hasta el año que 
viene y que las mercaderías que tuvieren las han de llevar a vender a ferias y mercados francos y 
esta asimismo es una de las causas por donde les parece que podrán pasar sin encabezarse por 
algunos días y en prosecución desta su yntención uno de los mercaderes de aquí hizo pregonar ayer 
tres del presente cierto memorial que un arrendador de Alcalá de Henares le envió ofreciendo por 
el ciertas bajas en las alcabalas si llevasen allí sus mercaderías a vender, pareciome que en esta 
ocasión no sanaba bien que un mercader se atreviese sin licencia y autoridad de la justicia hacer 
pregonar en Toledo cosa como esta, bien creo que los unos y los otros y señaladamente el 
escribano que no supieron ni atendieron tanto a lo que hacían, yo les hice llevar a la cárcel y están 
en ella” 
 
Document  7.  AGS,  CJH,  2001-647.  Memorial  de  Simón  Lercaro  al  Consejo  de 
Hacienda, 1575 
 
XXX“y lo que montare principal e intereses a buena quenta ora sea más o menos, se me mande dar 
luego cedula para que los contadores mayores me los libren por mitad en el segundo y postrer 
tercios deste presente año en este nuevo crecimiento de alcabalas en los partidos que yo señalare, 
(…) con condición que si acaeciese que el crecimiento de las dichas alcabalas no pasase adelante 
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que se me haya de librar y consignar en los primeros dinero que el Reyno diese a V. M. por 
donativo, o en otra qualquier manera en falta del dicho crecimiento” 
 
Document 8. AGS, CJH, 155. Memorial sin fecha, 1575. 
 
 
“Andres de Larrea, Juan de Ybarra y Andrés de Ecija vecinos de la ciudad de Burgos dezimos que 
Nicolao de Grimaldo, príncipe de Salerno, Juan Fernández de Espinosa y Esteban Lomelin nos 
deven más de ciento y veinte mil ducados de dineros que en esta feria les dimos para que nos los 
pagasen en Sevilla y Burgos y de libranzas de V. Mgd. sobre el servicio ordinario que les 
socorrimos, las quales por V. Mgd. se han mandado suspender y aunque en esta corte hemos 
intentado de cobrar de los susodichos lo que ansi nos deven no lo hemos podido ni podemos hazer 
respeto de aver mandado V. Mgd. impedir por el presente el cobrar dellos por justicia y quando 
nosotros de compañía dimos a los sobre dichos el dicho dinero y les socorrimos las libranzas 
tuvimos necesidad de tomar alguna cantidad de dineros a cambio de otras personas para los pagar 
en esta Corte, Burgos y Sevilla y Flandes, lo qual tomamos por nuestros créditos los quales 
avemos perdido y ni por ellos podremos ya allar ningún dinero ni otra azienda con que poder pagar 
lo que asi debemos ni la tenemos más de lo que nos deven los dichos Nicolao de Grimaldo, Joan 
Fernández de Espinosa, Esteban Lomelin y no es justo ni V. Mgd. lo deve permitir que por una 
parte se nos aya ynpedido y cerrado el camino para cobrar de los susodichos lo que ansi nos deven 
y por otra dejarle abierto para que nuestros acreedores nos puedan molestar con execuciones y 
prisiones. A V. Mgd. Pedimos y suplicamos muy umildemente nos mande dar su real cédula para 
que las justicias desta Corte ni las de la ciudad de Burgos, ni otras partes no nos agan molestias 
con execuciones ni prisiones y esto asta que V. Mgd. Aya mandado tomar algún buen medio con 
los susodichos o por el tiempo que vuestra real voluntad sea y en esto reciviremos bien y merced.” 
 
Document 9. AGS, CJH, 155.Memorial al Consejo de Hacienda presentado por varios 
hombres de negocios, sin fecha, aprox 1575” 
 
La suspensión que V. M. ha sido servido mandar hacer de las consignaciones, ha en manera 
suspenso todos los negocios y  alterado todos los créditos y  animos de los negociantes, no 
solamente en los desta Corte más en los de las otras plazas, que si V. M. No proveyese de algún 
remedio en el entretanto que V. M. Manda declarar su Real Voluntad acerca de la paga de lo que 
havemos de haver y que con el puedan los que deven entretener sus acreedores, muchos hombres 
de negocios por temor de las molestias y execuciones que se les podrían hacer se ausentarían, lo 
qual seria de gran perjuicio para todos los tratantes y el trato del todo caería, y la contratación y 
comercio se perdería de que a las rentas reales resultaría gran daño, y si V. M. Manda poner 
remedio en ello y con la confianza que se tiene que la paga que V. M: mandara hacer, será tal que 
se podrá dar entera satisfación a nuestros acreedores, cesaran estos inconvenientes y cada uno yra 
procurando entretenerse sin venir en desorden y se conservara todo el trato en pie y el comercio 
bivo, y la experiencia ha mostrado quan conveniente y necesario sea semejante remedio, pues en 
las partes y plazas a donde suele haver muchos negocios sea visto que siempre que ha acaecido 
algún notable acidente entre los tratantes que los príncipes han mandado suspender los pagamentos 
por algún tiempo, y proveydo que los que devian no fuesen molestados conociendo ser necesario el 
hacerlo por el bien de la república y para la conservación del trato y el haver V. M. Mandado 
proveer esto en esta corte se conoce quan acertado ha sido y sea no solamente para los que deven 
más para los que han de haver, pues en un açidente tan grande hasta agora no se a desordenado 
persona alguna y porque en Sevilla, Burgos, Granada y Medina del Campo como plaças de más 
negocios que las otras destos Reynos, todos nosotros havemos ynviado débitos para entretener y 
sustentar la mucha ocupación de hacienda con que a V. M. Havemos servido, y los ombres de 
negocios que residen en las dichas plazas, han aceptado y obligadose a la paga de los dichos 
débitos que les havemos sacado a pagar, si los a quien deven, los pudiesen molestar sucederían 
muchos inconvenientes, suplicamos a V. M. Que sea servido para la conservación del trato y para 
hacernos merced a todos, mandar a las justicias de las dichas ciudades de Sevilla, Burgos y villa de 
Medina del Campo que por el tiempo que fuere la voluntad de V. M., no admitan ninguna 
execución ni molesten a ningún ombre de negocios por las deudas que deven procedientes de 
cambios ni se haga ningun protesto contra ellos ni contra nosotros, según que se suele hacer 
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quando V. M. Manda prorrogar los pagamentos de feria lo qual es muy necesario para el remedio 
susodicho y en ello reçeviremos bien, gracia y merced. 
 
Firma: “Esteban Lercaro, Esteban Lomelin, Lucian Centurion y Agustín Spínola, Nicolao 
Grimaldo, Esteban Gentil, Agustin Gentil, Visconte Catano, el Principe de Salerno, Joan y Pau 
Sauri, ¿???” 
 
Respuesta: “Que se les de cédula para que ninguna justicia los execute por las deudas que deven 
procedentes de cambios” 
 
Document 10. AGS, CJH, 155. Memorial de Diego Ximénez al Consejo de Hacienda, 
25/04/1576. Se ordena pasárselo a Escobedo. 
 
“Diego Ximenez de Enciso, vezino de Logroño, por si y por otros vecinos de las ciudades de Santo 
Domingo de la Calçada y Nagera y villa de Toreçilla de los Cameros dize que por vecinos de 
Burgos, Vitoria, Medina del Campo y de otros lugares destos reynos esta V. Mgd. ymformado de 
los grandes  trabajos  y estremas necesidades  en que todos  estamos y  el general comercio y 
contratación después de la suspensión y decreto que V. Mgd. mandó hazer para remedio de los 
daños que V. Mgd. ha rescivido en asientos que sean hecho con estrangeros y particulares hombres 
de negocios, y si estos dapños redundasen en solo los decretados y en los que estos fiamos nuestras 
haziendas, paresçe que en cierta manera serian tolerables, pero juntamente con ellas y con las 
agenas que otros nos avian confiado, hemos perdido totalmente el crédito que es el nervio, alma y 
fuerza de la contratación, sin la qual, no es posible sustentarse ni entretenerse las republicas, las 
quales y las rentas reales creszen y se augmentan con el comercio, y sus fuerzas y de los príncipes 
principalmente consisten en las haziendas de los súbditos de esta verdad tiene V. Mgd. grande y 
particular noticia y experiencia en sus estados de Flandes, sin exemplos agenos, que con ser tierras 
marítimas y estíreles solo el comercio las ha hecho las mas ricas y abundantes de la Europa, 
juntase a lo dicho la calamidad y pobreza grande que de la nuestra se deriva en muchas personas 
que nos avian fiado sus haciendas, pensando tenerlas muy seguras y con solo el aprovechamiento 
que dellas les davamos sustentaban sus casas y familias, ansimismo muchos artífices y gente 
plebeya mecánica y jornalera que vivian y se sustentaban con la manufactura e industria 
pendientes de la contratación andan valdios, bagamundos, de lo qual subzeden y subzederan 
grandes daños en la Republica y en deservicio de Dios y de V. Mgd. , y este nuestro trabajo ha 
venido a tanto extremo que a los más de los que estamos en el (súbditos de V. Mgd. y naturales de 
estos Reynos) las justicias nos executan prenden y encarcelan nuestras personas por lo que 
debemos y venden a menos precios los pocos bienes y alajas que nos han quedado con que 
pensavamos poder entretenernos con alguna y muy moderada sustentación, otros que ya no pueden 
lo uno ni lo otro andan ausentados y por las yglesias, otros por libertar sus personas y no perder del 
todo su crédito (como cosa más importante al mercader) han hecho y hacen mohatras de lo que les 
ha quedado y de lanas y mercadurias que tenían compradas y dexan perder las señales que tenían 
dadas por no tener hazienda ni crédito con que acabar de pagar, por manera que el decreto de V. 
Mgd. (que se devio de hazer para  solo remediar a los daños y excesivos intereses que los 
estrangeros y los otros particulares pueden aver causado y llevado en los asientos que con V. Mgd. 
han hecho) parece en lo de hasta aquí, que solamente ha resultado de la ruyna y perdición de los 
súbditos de V. Mgd. (naturales destos Reynos que estamos libres y sin culpa alguna de la causa del 
decreto pues vemos que los culpados contra quienes se hizo, y sus bienes, están con esta ocasión, 
amparados por V. Mgd. y sus ministros y handan en su corte con la misma quietud gastos y 
demostración que estaban antes del decreto, y cobran con rigor de sus deudores y rentas sin pagar 
cossa alguna a sus acreedores, haciendo burla y ludibrio de nosotros, y aunque para algún remedio 
de esto hemos pedido a las justicias y ministros de V. Mgd. manden que los decretados pongan de 
manifiesto todos sus libros y papeles y den razón y quenta verdadera de el estado de sus haziendas 
como estaban antes y al tiempo de la suspensión y decreto de V. Mgd. hasta ahora no se ha 
proveido (siendo cosa tan justo y conveniente) y con esto los decretados han tenido lugar y ocasión 
(si lo han querido hazer) para asentar en sus libros y remover de sus papeles lo que les ha parecido 
para poder encubrir las haziendas que tienen fuera de lo que V. Mgd les puede deber en tanto 
grado que con libertad dizen y publican que la hazienda que les sobrare conforme al decreto y toda 
la que más tienen la han de aver otros acreedores que tienen de sumiçion y que aquellos han de 
37  
preferir a los súbditos y naturales destos reynos porque dizen que para esto tienen justos títulos. 
Demas de lo dicho pareze muy justo que si los decretados han de estar amparados como hasta aquí, 
hasta que el decreto se execute o V. Mgd aya puesto en ello, otro remedio que V. Mgd. debe 
mandar hacernos en esto yguales a ellos de manera que a los que somos acreedores de los 
decretados no nos fatiguen ni molesten los nuestros ni las justicias de V. Mgd constándoles que 
después de lo necesario para el moderado sustentamiento de nuestras casas y familias, no tenemos 
otras haziendas con que satisfazerles sino las que nos deven los decretados, pues en efecto están y 
se convertieron enteramente en servicio de V. Mgd., y sin ellas no cumplieran los socorros que 
hizieron a V. Mgd. 
 
Por que si esto no se haze es cosa cierta que caeremos todos en lo que disponen las últimas 
prematicas hechas por V. Mgd con los mercaderes que están insolventes y no pagan lo que deben y 
quedaremos ynavilitados para proseguir y continuar la contratación aun que después viniésemos a 
cobrar lo que nos deven los decretados. Suplicamos humildemente a V. Mgd sea servido con su 
Christianísima clemencia y misericordia apiadarse de su pueblo y súbditos naturales, poniendo con 
brevedad algún remedio y fin a tantos daños y calamidades como todos padezemos y podrán 
subzeder a todo el universal comercio de estos Reynos y rentas reales de V. Mgd. y si para mayor 
satisfación de que sea verdad todo lo referido (y mucho mas que se podría decir) fuere V. Mgd. 
servido y de ello ay necesidad averiguación y mande V. Mgd. que las justicias ordinarias o 
particulares ministros de V. Mgd. de los dichos del servicio de Dios y de V. Mgd y bien universal 
de sus Reynos hagan con brevedad verdadera ynquisicion de todo para que sobre ella V. Mgd 
provea de remedio conveniente de lo qual ay grandísima necesidad.” 
 
Document 11. AGS, CJH, 155. Memorial de Esteban Lomelin al Consejo de Hacienda, 
1575 
 
“Esteban Lomelin dize que para en quenta de trescientos y veynte y dos quentos de mrs con que 
socorrió a V. Mgd. por un asiento que se tomo con el en 8 de henero deste año de 75 le fueron 
librados quarenta mil ducados en Sevilla en el cambio de Pedro de Morga y compañía, los quales 
el no acetó ny pagó, diciendo que por otra cedula de V. Mgd. se le avia mandado que acudiese a 
Francisco Duarte con todo el dinero que estaba a su cargo, y por razón desto se le dio otra librança 
sobre el dicho Francisco Duarte para que le pagase los dichos quarenta mil ducados y por virtud 
della se los libró en el dicho Pedro de Morga, y el se dio por pagado y otorgó carta de pago y 
finequito dellos al dicho Francisco Duarte y le entregó la librança que se le avia dado, y el dicho 
Pedro de Morga los asentó y pasó en quenta del dicho Esteban Lomelin en su cambio a donde los 
ha tenido y tiene a su riesgo desde principio de julio deste año, y agora después desto el asistente 
de la dicha ciudad de Sevilla so color de la suspensión que V. Mgd. mandó hazer de las libranzas 
que se avían dado y no estaban pagadas, le embargo los dichos quarenta mil ducados en el dicho 
cambio, y porque la dicha suspensión no se podía entender por las libranças que ya estaban 
pagadas, y demás desto montando lo que se le debe más de un millón y medio de ducados con no 
haver más de cinco años que V. Mgd. mandó negociar con él, y no tener de resguardo más de 
veynti mil ducados de juro, no seria justo de mas de no se le pagar lo que se le queda deviendo se 
le embargase lo que ya tenía cobrado. Por tanto, supplica a V. Mgd. se sirva de proveer y mandar 
que se le alçe el dicho embargo para que se pueda valer dellos para pagar algunas deudas forçosas 
y proveer a si mesmo y a sus hermanos y otros deudos que le an acomodado con lo que ha 
socorrido a V.Mgd. los quales teniendo perdido el crédito por la dicha suspensión no tienen 
posibilidad de sustentar sus casas, y en esto recibirá mucha merced y justicia.” 
 
Document 12. AGS, CJH, 154. Memorial de Andrés de Larrea, 1576. 
 
 
“yo me allo tan imposibilitado no tan solamente de dar las dichas fianzas que me pide pero ni dar 
fianzas de la haz para curarme fuera desta cárcel de enfermedad que tengo no las he allado por lo 
qual padezco mucha necesidad y trabajo en dos meses que ha que estoy preso y porque no es justo 
que yo este preso y molestado y mis deudores sueltos y amparados sin poder cobrar dellos aunque 
he hecho mis diligencias y no me quieren los alcaldes de corte dar mandamiento de execución 
contra ellos” 
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Document 13. AGS, CJH, 155. Memorial de Joan de Lago al CH, 1575. 
 
 
“Joan de Lago, vecino de Burgos, dio ayer a V. M. un memorial el qual a remitido al Consejo de 
los seys que tratan del decreto la dilación que en esto ay es nuestra total ruyna, los ministros de V. 
Mgd. nos executan y aprivisonan de manera que no nos podemos prevaler por la falta de nuestras 
aciendas y créditos que es lo más importante en la contratación. Nicolao de Grimaldo y los demás 
que nos deben están amparados por V. Mgd. De manera que no podemos pedirles por xusticia 
executando sus bienes y aprisionando sus personas sus libros y papeles tienen y poseyn como antes 
sin que los apremien. Los exibian de que nos es notable daño por que husan de lo que tienen a 
cobrar a su voluntad y para esto están con libertad y sin ella para pagar. Por reverencia de los V.M. 
se apiade de nosotros y de nuestro trabajo. Remediando esto con la acostumbrada clemencia de V. 
Mgd. Y la brevedad es la que nos ymporta siendo asi las rentas reales de V. Mgd. No disminuyran 
como será siendo su contrario. Joan de Lago.” 
 
Document 14. AGS, CJH, 155. Memorial de Sebastián López de Orozco, 1575. 
 
 
“El contador Sebastián López de Horozco dize que de quatro meses antes de la suspensión tenia 
puestas en deposito en el Principe de Salerno seisçientas y setenta y dos mil mrs como parece por 
su cedula reconoçida los quales aunque él a cobrado y cobra de quien le debe mucha suma de mrs 
no se los a querido pagar ni parte alguna dellos diciendo no tener bienes de que podello hazer por 
tenerle V. Mgd. suspendidas sus libranzas, y abiendo venido a su noticia que don Rodrigo de 
Mendoza, caballero de Alcántara, le debía ochocientas y ochenta y quatro mil y setecientos y diez 
mrs, la mitad que le abía de pagar en fin del mes de abril pasado y la otra mitad en un año rogó al 
dicho Principe le cediese la deuda o parte alguna della o de lo que abia de aber de presente o de los 
por venir la parte que el quisiese para socorrer sus necesidades que el dicho don Rodrigo tuviera 
por bien de pagárselos a el, lo qual nunca quiso ni quiere hazer sino cobrallos él a cuya causa se las 
hizo embargar en el dicho don Rodrigo y el dicho Principe visto esto a dado lugar a que ayan 
hecho otro embargo, a V. Mgd. pido y suplico que pues por lo susodicho consta la malicia del 
dicho Principe y que el no pagalle lo que ansi le debe no es por falta de bienes sino por no querer 
se a servido de mandarle hazer pagado de lo que el dicho don Rodrigo le debe o que le pueda 
ejecutar y no permita que no abiendo hecho cosa indebida le detengan sin hazienda y hagan 
padecer necesidad y que pues ellos cobra de los que les deben no dexen de pagar a los naturales 
destos reynos a quien deben” 
 





“Y juntándose a todo esto la suplicación que nos an hecho con particular ystancia sobre este 
mismo negocio los procuradores de estos reynos que están juntos en las Cortes que al presente 
celebramos en la villa de Madrid 
 
El rey explica que los intereses que se pagaban a los banqueros, son en gran parte para 




“deviesemos a los dichos ombres de negocios acabadas sus quentas de todo lo qual ellos se 
agraviaron diciendo haver padecido, pagado y gastado de los dineros que nos habían proveydo 
grandes intereses a otras personas asi en las ferias y plaços destos reynos como en las de fuera de 
ellos en las quales les havia sido forçoso tomar a cambio y socorrerse por otras vías hordinarias y 
extraordinarias de muchas y gruesas cantidades de dinero para cumplir y pagar puntualmente los 
asientos que con ellos haviamos mandado tomar y que por ser cantidades con que asi nos habían 
socorrido tan gruesas y en tiempos estrechos hera muy notorio que no lo habían podido hazer con 
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sus propias haciendas y que así habían usado para ello de sus créditos e yndustrias con lo qual nos 
habían servido como factores nuestros a cuya causa les havia quedado de los dichos negocios muy 
moderado aprovechamiento y aún en algunos no habían tenido ninguno por ser mayores los 
intereses que ellos habían padecido que los que no les davamos” 
 
El rey reconoce la importancia que tienen las ferias para el trabajo de los banqueros y 




“los dichos ombres de negocios nos han suplicado con instancia que se hordenen las ferias destos 
reynos las quales queremos y avemos mandado que se agan de aquí adelante puntualmente a sus 
tiempos ordinarios sin que se alarguen dilaten ni prorroguen por ninguna causa siendo como esto 
es tan necesario al beneficio publico y para poder hacer con más crédito, reputación y comodidad 
las provisiones de dinero que fuere menester para el entretenimiento de nuestros exercitos y 
armadas y las otras expediciones que se ofrecieren y también para que los dichos ombres de 
negocios nos puedan mejor servir en esto y restaurar y establecer sus créditos” 
 





“y por la presente damos por ninguno y de ningún valor y efecto el decreto de primero de 
septiembre de mil y quinientos y setenta y cinco y cédulas de que de suso se haze mención y otras 
qualesquier que cerca dello se ayan despachado para que no se aya de usar cosa alguna en las 
personas que entran y entraren según dicho es en este dicho asiento ni en sus bienes” 
 
Document 16. IVDJ, Envío 22. Caja 33, TB 49, folio 98. Carta de Fernández de 
Espinosa a Mateo Vázquez, 11/08/1577. 
 
“Mandan lo que se huviere de hacer para acabar de manera que no haya aca poderes, ocasiones ni 
licencia de errar en cossas tan grandes y en numero tan pocas, pues son dos negocios: Medio y 
encabezamiento” 
 
Document 17. IVDJ, Envío 76. Fols. 554-557. San Lorenzo del Escorial, 7/07/1577. 
Minuta de carta redactada por la secretaría de Felipe II en su nombre. 
 
“Después que me enbiastes estas consultas de lo que ha parecido para el Medio general y en lo del 
encabezamiento he ydo mirando y pensando con mucho cuydado en lo uno y lo otro, assi por lo 
que ambas cosas importan en la substancia y lo que della depende como por lo que la brevedad 
espera todo menester, y teniendo yo por muy dependiente el un negocio del otro…” 
 
Document 18. AGS, CJH Libros, 42, f. 42v. Copia cédula, Madrid, 25/05/1578. 
 
 
“Y mandamos hazer cierto decreto de la forma y orden como havian de ser pagos de nos de lo que 
les deviamos por los dichos asientos y cambios y después aviéndosenos hecho relación por los 
dichos hombres de negocios y por los diputados que para ello nombraron que si el dicho decreto se 
hubiese de ejecutar ellos quedarían perdidos y destruidos y sin ninguna hacienda para pagar sus 
acreedores y el trato y comercio destos reinos y los derechos reales que en ellos llevamos vendrían 
en mucha quiebra y disminución y suplicándosenos mandásemos tomar sobre ellos algún medio y 
concierto de manera que cesasen los dichos daños e inconvenientes y las dichas personas de 
negocios quedasen con alguna sustancia de hacienda, y hechose instancia sobre esto mismo por los 
embajadores de la república de Génova que para ellos nos embiaron, y por los procuradores de 
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Cortes destos reynos que se hallaron en las que últimamente celebramos en la villa de Madrid, 
mandamos tomar con algunas de las dichas personas de negocios cierto asiento y medio general en 
cinco de diciembre del año pasado de 1577…”. 
 
Document 19. AGS, CJH, 164. Cédula, 31/05/1574. 
 
 
“que las ferias de mayo y octubre de los años de 1572, 1573 y 1574 se hagan todas juntas desde 15 
de octubre deste año de 1574 hasta 30 de noviembre en Medina y las de los años adelante a los 
tiempos y plazos que se acostumbra hacer que son feria de mayo desde 11 de junio hasta fin de 
julio, y los de feria de octubre desde 28 de octubre hasta 16 de diciembre, sin que se alarguen mas” 
 
Document  20.  AGS,  Estado  Génova,  1408-20.  Carta  de  D.  Juan  de  Idiáquez  al 
secretario del rey Antonio Pérez, Génova, 21/11/1576. 
 
“y escrito hemos también a su merced la instancia que esta señoría hace por que tenga fin la que se 
huviere de declarar sobre el decreto y si así no se hiciere creen que presto havra muchos alzados y 
quebrados porque parece que no se prorrogaran más los pagamentos que de una feria a otra ha 
prorrogado esta señoría los meses pasados” 
 
Document  21.  AGS,  CJH,  151.  Carta  de  Andrés  de  Cañas  a  Juan  de  Escobedo 
(secretario de Felipe II), 20/04/1576. 
 
“Andrés de Cañas, vecino de Burgos suplico a V. Mg. Sea servido de aver piedad del daño tan 
notable que yo e los demás de aquella ciudad emos recibido con Nicolao de Grimaldo por no 
pagarnos lo que nos debe diciendo no poder a causa de la suspensión que V. Mg. Ha hecho de las 
libranzas que le tenía dadas. No solamente perdemos las haciendas que tenemos ocupadas en esto 
sino lo demás que nos quedaba por aber consumido muy gran parte en pagar lo que debíamos y si 
algo nos queda no podemos negociar con ello por tenerla ocupada en diversos reynos y diversas 
mercaderías y abiendonos faltado como nos falta ynstrumento principal de la contratación no 
podemos hacer negocio de nuevo y asi cesamos de contratar en nuestro hordinario trato que es en 
lanas y mercaderías con que ganamos de comer y ayudamos a la República y servimos a V. Mg. 
En sus rentas reales por servicio de dios se apiade V. Mg. De nuestro daño recibido con inocencia 
y llaneza de nuestro trato mandando seamos con brevedad pagados porque la dilación es nuestra 
total ruina y hasta ahora sea suplicado a V.Mg. de parte de prior y consules de Burgos por nuestro 
remedio viendo nuestros daños y trabajos y como cada día crecen y no lo podemos reparar nos 
hemos determinado de venir a hecharnos a los pies de V. Mg. Para que se apiade de nosotros y no 
permita vengamos a morir en las cárceles y aquella ciudad arruinarse y consumirse, pues sin trato 
y negociación no se puede sustentar por no llevar a otro fruto aquella tierra.” 
 
Respuesta del secretario o del rey: “que brevemente se proveerá” 
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